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Andrew Ross
Judith Becker and Ellen Levine, the two women who wrote a dissent-
ing statement on the Report of the 1986 Meese Commission on Pornogra-
phy, pointed out that it was almost impossible, under the conditions of the
Commission's public forum, to find people willing to acknowledge their
pleasurable consumption and use of pornographic materials. In the light
of the "millions of apparently satisfied customers," they added, "it seems
obvious that the data gathered [by the Commission] is not well balanced." 1
Even if such favorable testimony had been easier to elicit, it is unlikely to
have been welcome, given the Commission's heavily ideological mandate.
But such a scenario, with such testimony, gives pause, and raises some
wild thoughts. What would the Commission have done with a chorus of
diverse confessions and ratifications of pleasure? Would this testimony
have compromised or reinforced its conclusions? Does the business of such
commissions involve bypassing or overlooking this kind of testimony?
Given the restricted purview of liberal law, which addresses considera-
tions of harm, acts in the name of protection and appeals to the concept of
negative liberty, the answer to these questions is likely to remain moot. In
the case of pornography, however, I think that we ought to imagine what
might be learned from a critical inquiry into consumer pleasures. For a
start, it would help to address one of the 1986 Commission's own recorded
complaints; in a rare enlightened moment born of frustration, the Report
notes with regret that virtually all of the historical study of pornography
has not been about "the social practice of pornography," but rather about
the "control of that social practice by government," and recommends that
if the use of pornography is "to be understood fully," then "the scope of
thinking about the issue should be broadened substantially."'
Of course, the knowledge that would come from a fuller understanding
might simply be used to extend or fortify the structures of regulation,
1. The Attorney General's Commission on Pornography, Final Report, 2 vols. (Washington,
D.C., 1986), p. 196.
2. Ibid., p. 236.
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thereby adding to the long history of control and containment. On the
other hand, a broadened inquiry would also tell us a good deal about how
people, male and female, straight and gay, use pornographic materials to
respond, imaginatively or otherwise, to the vicissitudes of power in their
daily lives. It would tell us a good deal about how capitalism's production
of marketed pleasure is variously rearticulated through people's own im-
aginary relations to the daily round of work and leisure. It would tell us
how people variously respond to the invitation to think of their bodies as a
potential source of achieved freedom, rather than a prison-house of troub-
lesome bodily functions or a pliant tool for the profitable use of others,
whether patriarchs or capitalists. It would tell us how and why people are
attracted by, or feel they are entitled to, a different morality than that laid
down by the appointed or self-styled intellectual protectors of the public
interest. It would tell us what people say they do and think about a world
of represented pleasure, marked in some way as illegitimate or unrealiz-
able, and imagined on their behalf by a far from monolithic culture indus-
try. In short, it would tell us how and why pornography is not always
what it says it is.
No commission exists to hear such testimony, and virtually no cultural
study that has listened hard to an audience of popular consumers has ever
been conducted to make sense of such testimony. It is not the sort of
knowledge, moreover, that a revised Kinsey report (currently being pre-
pared) is likely to provide. The lack of audience-oriented cultural study
(as opposed to spectator-oriented theory) of what was, until recently, a
predominantly "men's genre" is quite surprising, especially since many
important studies of "women's" cultural genres have been written re-
cently. Male silence, of course, is largely to blame. But the scarcity can
also be attributed to the fact that the intellectual debate about pornogra-
phy over the last decade has been governed almost entirely by the terms of
the feminist antiporn movement, in particular those of the WAP group
(Women Against Pornography), and thus it has been waged on uncom-
promisingly Manichean ground-agreement or disagreement? critique or
defense? resistance or collaboration? It has not been easy, under these cir-
cumstances, for men and women alike to "broaden the scope of inquiry,"
to use the Commission's terms, beyond questions of proscription and pro-
tection to include considerations of audience use that are not governed by
a discourse of harms, on the one hand, or a discourse of constitutional
freedoms on the other. That this initiative has been undertaken in recent
years by anti-antiporn feminists, especially those in the Feminist Anti-
Censorship Taskforce (FACT), was inevitable, not to mention coura-
geous. But evidence of a correspondingly specific male response, whether
straight or gay, to pornography's business of representing sexual pleasure
has been a long time coming, and is most likely to be directed now (with
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good reason and with political urgency) at the deadly triangle of State,
bodies and representations which circumscribes the AIDS crisis.
To understand the defining terms and premises of the WAP agenda,
nothing is more handy or evocative than Catharine MacKinnon's volume
of collected essays, addresses, and speeches of the last six years, published
now under the title Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law.
From MacKinnon's point of view, the kind of "commission" that I earlier
imagined already exists. We do not need an Attorney General, who, the
experts agree, was a pig, to appoint it or to organize it along official legis-
lative lines. Such a forum is already so perfectly and systematically organ-
ized in reality that it need never be instituted in the specious name of
public morality or the common good. For MacKinnon, such a forum al-
ready exists in pornography itself. Pornography is the public speech of
men (and women) talking about the pleasure they derive from sexual ag-
gression and passive victimage. Pornography is our most fully articulated
expression of patriarchal domination. And if this is what pornography
says, then pornography is always what it says it is (and to her all other
theories are fantasy, literally).
All of MacKinnon's superb discursive skills as a legal activist and or-
ganic feminist intellectual are directed towards this reductionist premise.
It is a premise, I should add, which is not at all afraid or ashamed of
being called reductionist. It is a premise that intends to be reductionist,
and WAP has built a popular movement, arguably the most popular
movement within the women's movement, around it. Which orthodox so-
cialist, for example, does not acknowledge the rhetorical power of being
able to reduce the most abstract theoretical analysis of social antagonisms
and overdeterminations to the concrete principle of class struggle-that's
all that it boils down to, that's what counts, so listen up and bear it in
mind? Thus, MacKinnon can offer us, in a "real five-dollar sentence," as
she puts it, her conclusions about the close fit between socially available
definitions of knowledge about sexuality and patriarchal power itself:
"pornography is a set of hermeneutical equivalences that work on the
epistemological level" (p. 190). The support for this proposition lies in an
analysis of how knowledge and power are officially and seamlessly al-
igned, especially in the realm of what she usefully calls the "hegemony of
legalism" (p. 129). But her analytic proposition, she says, is best reduced
to the slogan: "what pornography means is what it does." Whether or not
this slogan appears to say the same thing as the vexed five-dollar sentence,
it cogently reaffirms her view that if pornography is an intentional act of
power, then its intentions, despite what the "interpretation people" say,
are always realized-pornography means what it does (to passive people),
rather than what (non-passive) people do with it, which would be a dif-
ferent proposition altogether.
Regardless of whether one agrees with the particular reductions, flawed
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or not, at stake in her arguments about pornography (I do not), MacKin-
non's capacity to reduce complex five-dollar analyses to bite-sized pro-
positions should not be distrusted in itself. On the contrary, this ability is
an indispensable skill for the intellectual who wants to mediate theoretical
labor with the need to make active interventions in the realm of "common
sense." Such a strategy is part and parcel of the contest over popular con-
sent. But consent is not a fixed contract; it operates on a shifting terrain of
ideas and values, redefined from moment to moment. One need only look
at how pornography's generic contents have shifted over the last decade to
incorporate, assimilate and rearticulate the anxieties, desires, and critiques
that have arisen from the various sexual liberation and women's move-
ments to find an a propos example of this constant process of incorpora-
tion and redefinition. (Linda Williams' Hard-Core: The Frenzy of the
Visible analyzes this particular history of pornography's generic responses
to shifts in thinking about female sexuality). 3 Reading through MacKin-
non's collection, which covers the five years from the moment of solidarity
of WAP consciousness in 1982 through the aftermath of the Supreme
Court decision about the unconstitutionality of the Indianapolis antiporn
ordinance" to the Meese Commission Report itself, one is struck by how
alien to her position is this process of redefinition, from year to year, from
moment to moment, from context to context, in theory or in practice.
There is a pejorative way of describing this unyielding fix-
ity-obdurate, intractable, recalcitrant, and, in its conventional political
meaning, reductionist. There is also a vocabulary for praising it-staunch,
resolute, steadfast, and unwavering. But one could say the same of any
radical critique which holds to its high ground. What makes the WAP
position on pornography different is not simply that it will not budge.
What makes it different is that it rejects what we have come to accept, at
least since Gramsci, as a fundamental division of power in a modern, heg-
emonic, capitalist society: the modern ascendancy of consent over coercion,
whereby power, to put it bluntly, is exercised by negotiation through eve-
ryday cultural relations rather than imposed by force or by threat of com-
pulsion. In the case of pornography, says the WAP position, this distinc-
tion cannot be maintained because the representations it offers are those of
a coercive reality (of male domination) which not only reinforces or acts
out, but also overrides the function of consent normally allotted to a cul-
tural medium which trades in words and/or images. One could say, then,
that the basic premise of the WAP position is that pornography is the
singular exception to this "rule" of modern power which otherwise ex-
plains how mass populations are "managed" in a hegemonic democracy.
3. Forthcoming, University of California Press, 1989.
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On that premise rests the claim that whatever it is, pornography is not
like anything else in our cultural or social life. And because of the logic of
that premise, pornography must be seen as a perishable realm of violent
action (rather than a realm of expressive discourse) about which there can
be no arguing, no redefining, no wars of persuasion, and no changing the
rules of consent.
Wherever possible, MacKinnon is indeed quick to insist that pornogra-
phy is not like any other political issue: "Speaking about pornography is
not like speaking about anything else. It is crazier. It has logic by Escher.
Things fall up. It makes grown men cry and smart people stupid" (p.
221). The direct intimation of infantilism and stupidity I will return to.
For the present, because this is a review of her book, I will point to the
logic, Escheresque or not, which generates MacKinnon's polemical con-
struction of those who have taken issue with her antiporn position and
arguments. While the bulk or polemical weight of her collected papers
and addresses is aimed against male agents of patriarchal authority, the
volume is more decisively framed by and shot through with powerful at-
tacks on feminist dissenters. MacKinnon's attacks are themselves a strik-
ing demonstration of how force-the violence that is objectively isolated at
the core of the antiporn critique-engenders force; and thus how the para-
noid logic of aggressivity here engenders aggressivity. This pattern harks
back to the sectarian violence and virility wars of the late sixties from
which crucible the women's movement was first forged as a corrective
counter-example. Writing her introduction and afterword in the aftermath
of the legal defeat of the antiporn ordinances which she co-wrote with
Andrea Dworkin, MacKinnon makes it quite clear that she holds other
women, especially feminists, responsible for the defeats and decline of
women's legal reform in the last decade. The opposition of "liberal" femi-
nists to the antiporn ordinances is no different in her eyes from the oppo-
sition of conservative women to ERA. As for successes like Roe v. Wade,'
the legalization of abortion, in MacKinnon's view, only freed women for
male sexual aggression-nothing more, nothing less. If feminism is simply
wanting access to what men have, then, she says, quoting Dworkin, femi-
nism "deserves to die" (p. 5). "Liberal" feminism, which deserves to die,
is everywhere aligned with the constitutional liberalism of the law which
protects the distinction between public and private life that is so antago-
nistic to the feminist principle that "the personal is the political." It is no
surprise, then, that MacKinnon reserves her highest contempt for female
lawyers, especially those who "defend" pornography, thereby acting as
procurers for men, or else lawyers who, acting on women's behalf, merely
"look at cases the way surfers look at waves" (p. 13). (Later, by contrast
and on a frustrated note, MacKinnon compares her own activist struggle
5. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
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to feeling at times as if she were just "spitting in the ocean.") What law
school does, after all, is to tell you "that to become a lawyer is to forget
your feelings, forget your community, most of all, if you are a woman,
forget your experience. Become a maze-bright rat. Women lawyers . . .
go dead in the eyes like ghetto children, unlike the men, who come out of
law school glowing in the dark." (p. 205)
Leaving aside the wildly mixed, radioactive metaphors, one is tempted
to say that it is something of an American luxury to speak thus of the
legal system. Like many fellow Britons, I am often astonished at the lee-
way (I will not say "opportunities") that exists in America for all kinds of
legal activism; activism pursued in courts and avenues of possible contesta-
tion that can vanish into thin air at the flourish of a parliamentary wand
in the country where I grew up. I would not be willing to push that
reservation much further, but it does help to lend some perspective to the
national specificity of the comments with which MacKinnon ended that
same speech about the "maze-bright rats":
I really want you to stop your lies and misrepresentations of our
position. I want you to do something about your thundering igno-
rance about the way women are treated. I want you to remember
your own lives. I also really want you on our side. But, failing that,
I want you to stop claiming that your liberalism, with its elitism,
and your Freudianism, with its sexualized misogyny, has anything in
common with feminism (p. 205).
The address is to an audience of feminists, at the National Conference on
Women and the Law in 1985, and MacKinnon prefaces her speech, as
she often does, with the revivalist ritual of bearing witness to her own
credentials of redemption: "the struggle against pornography . . .. has
freed me to say this." It is difficult, at least for me, to imagine this scena-
rio taking place anywhere else in the world, where the credentials of
"freedom" in the name of political action are everywhere likely to mean
something quite different from the American inflection derived by Mac-
Kinnonite feminism from the opposition between pornography's "free
speech" and her own "freed speech." "Only in America," with its cult of
citizenship and constitutional freedoms, does the ritual of being born
again lend itself so readily and with such a privileged subjective cast to
the assumption of a freely chosen secular identity. "Only in America" can
the ideological inflections of "freedom" be so awesomely reinforced by the
act of faith that results in joining a secular elect. This peculiarly local
rhetoric of redemption has its appropriate place in the context of the his-
tory of national attempts at moral regulation and social purification. But
it also has to be seen against the perspective of the more global claims of
WAP about the ahistorical and universal condition of patriarchal domina-
tion, of which pornography is seen as the consummate symptom, seam-
[Vol. 1: 193
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lessly and intertextually woven into the monolithic system of multinational
capitalism, whose international division of labor is everywhere under-
pinned by an international trade in sexual slavery. From a non-American
point of view, the missionary rhetoric of freedom is going to sound even
more voluntarist and redemptionary, and the particular shape of MacKin-
non's attack on those feminists she calls "collaborators" because she says
that they feminize Freud is going to appear bizarrely provincial.
MacKinnon's low opinion of Freud, or the feminized Freud, even if it
is barely developed beyond a caricature, is strategically used in the first
strike against what she calls liberal feminism. For her, Freud simply
means "derepression theory." This is the theory which she believes that
liberal feminism has taken as the cornerstone of women's sexual libera-
tion, as an idea of freedom and emancipated consciousness that is in real-
ity nothing more than a ruse of patriarchy. By contrast, the Freud who
has figured most significantly in the anti-antiporn arguments does not ex-
ist at all in her book. Those insights which are most useful to an under-
standing of pornography's mechanisms of desire-insights about fantasy,
narcissism, voyeurism, exhibitionism, psychic resistance and, most of all,
aggressivity-can all be dismissively accounted for, in MacKinnon's view,
by Freud's refusal to believe women's stories about sexual abuse. True
feminism, she maintains, "is built on believing women's accounts of sexual
use and abuse by men" (p. 5). That is historically undeniable, but in
equating Freud's refusal with the antithesis of true feminism she invites a
much larger refusal on behalf of her readers and herself-the unconscious
simply disappears. All of the difficult lessons that psychoanalysis has to
offer about the psycho-sexual construction of identity are passed off as
patriarchal history lessons. All of the troublesome evidence about fantasies
of aggression and patterns of self-destruction are rejected as instruments of
submission to domination. Even if MacKinnon were to take psychoanaly-
sis more seriously than she does, she would quickly see that it has little in
the way of positivity to lend to her model of power, raising epistemologi-
cal obstacles and inconveniences at every turn. Instead of being seen as
simply imposed-"the velvet glove on the iron fist of domination" (p.
8)-and thus dismissable by voluntarist acts of social faith, sexual differ-
ence would have to be viewed as the socialized result of certain pre-social
fantasies of identity. Consequently, sexual difference would have to be
seen as a long-term construction to be accounted for in estimations of so-
cial action and philosophy, and not just as a temporary effect of power
that conceals the work of patriarchal force and violence.
On a more speculative note, with Gothic overtones (which would need
more space than I have to develop here), it might be necessary to show
how the repression of psychoanalytic knowledge returns in MacKinnon's
paranoiac construction of her own position, underpinned everywhere by
WAP's unremitting theoretical focus on women's victimage. Aggressivity
Ross
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is played out (the Lacanian lesson) through mirror-images where revers-
ible and accumulated reflections suggest a self-identical presence that is
larger than life, and where imagined threats to this presence often take the
form of paranoia answering paranoia. To pursue such a line of reasoning
might help to explain the defensive aggressivity with which MacKinnon
characterizes the arguments of her chief targets, whether collaborationist
feminists or liberal lawyers. Perhaps it is no surprise that, for her and
others, pornography, defined by WAP as an exclusive arena of violence,
has come to be seen as a "final" battlefield in appropriately religious
terms, and that a feminism which "deserves to die" is lined up on the side
of the infidels, non-believers, lapsarians, and assorted satanists.
To be fair to MacKinnon, however, demonizing is not really her style.
While her position, and her defense of it, are locked into the circuit of
aggression which, I think, the antiporn definition of pornography gener-
ates, her preferred philosophical medium is through analyses of epistemol-
ogy and power, as opposed to theology and faith. The result is arguably
more demeaning, however, when it comes to explaining the reluctance of
her critics to see the light. One is left, again and again, with the impres-
sion that she thinks not simply that the non-believers are wrong or evil,
but rather that they are stupid. Stupid in the mind, because, by charging
that they are helping to crucify others on pornography's cross, MacKin-
non can challenge a whole tradition of neo-Platonic epistemology by re-
fusing to forgive them because "they know not what they do." And stupid
in the flesh, because everybody, as MacKinnon points out, has the capac-
ity to be fooled into complicity "through the stirring between their legs"
(p. 15), that is, unless they come to see that "a good fuck is [no] compen-
sation for getting fucked" (p. 61). Here, then, are the seeds of a full-
blown epistemology of stupidity, or is it just stupid epistemology? Is it bad
faith when MacKinnon sets out, as she invariably does, to invoke episte-
mology only to impatiently brush it aside when the polemical going gets
tough? Or is stupidity an integral aspect of what MacKinnon means to
expose when she investigates the overlap between epistemology and
power?
It seems to me that these are important questions. On the one hand, one
could say there is just another story about reductionism to tell here, and
that it is a story of impatience and frustration with the slow, messy me-
dium of contestation-things are quite clear, why can't you see them? I
have argued, however, that MacKinnon's reductionism is partly inten-
tional, and I have no real problem with that. Politics would not move us
otherwise, and, as Cornel West is fond of saying, there are many activists
who, when it comes to getting the job done, don't have much interest in
epistemology. On the other hand, it is important to recognize that Mac-
Kinnon does have a professed interest in epistemology. First, because she
says that she wants to show what the "epistemology of the powerless"
200 [Vol. 1: 193
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might look like, in life and in law; and second, because, as an intellectual,
raised on what she views, with admirable ambivalence, as the privileges of
knowledge itself, she must know and regret that it is the function of most
intellectuals simply to legitimize ideas, values and beliefs that tend to
serve the interests of the powerful. Knowledge, for her, must be seen as
the ground of power, but it is often too stupid to see this for itself.
Actually, I think that there are two kinds of stupidity at issue here in
what MacKinnon is saying. The first is the stupidity of intellectuals, in
this case, anti-antiporn intellectuals, liberal lawyers, and all those with
high positions and privileges within the system to secure and defend. That
stupidity is not gender-specific. The second kind of stupidity, which ap-
pears to be gender-specific, and which does not exempt female intellectu-
als, covers the realm of consent, complicity, collusion and even what
MacKinnon calls collaboration. For the most part, this second kind of
stupidity is the lived effect of a hegemonic system whose primary agent of
power, the institution of heterosexuality, works to organize women's
pleasure in such a way as to give them a stake in their own subordination.
The important question here is whether pleasure, the "women's pleasure"
that MacKinnon believes is a ruse or cause of stupidity, can be thought of
as something other than a manipulative tool or an attractive token of ser-
vitude, something other than a Pavlovian reward for obedience or a glit-
tering bribe. MacKinnon's recruitist posture assumes that pleasure is only
skin deep, that it is a quantitative reserve of experience, emotion and ac-
tion that is inauthentically organized in its present form and which can
therefore be channelled elsewhere and reformed towards politically pro-
gressive ends. Pleasure has no relative autonomy for those who experience
it, and offers no potential ground from which to contest "official" defini-
tions of gendered conduct in everyday life. In short, pleasure makes
women stupid where they ought to be militant.
This is the epistemology of Leninism, because it says that people do not
really know what's good for them. The politics it supports involve learn-
ing to speak another language, rather than contesting the vocabulary with
which people are familiar. It is a politics that does not meet people where
they are, but tells them where they should be. It sees cultural forms like
pornography as always successfully dictating cultural responses, and it ar-
gues that there is only one (confiscatory) thing to be done about that. Last
but not least, it presents a conspiratorial view of pleasure as a swindle, as
a mindless, diversionary side-show along the path of pure action. A polit-
ics without pleasure-who on earth would want it?
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